Brian Hamilton

Surrogate Motherhood: A Case Study

The desire is a fairly straightforward one: Emily and her husband are retiring, and they want to have kids. But, since Emily is postmenopausal, they cannot conceive naturally. Instead, the couple wants to implant another egg, fertilized with her husband’s sperm, into Emily’s uterus and allow her to carry it to term. Certainly, though, many would object to such a solution—and it seems that Dr. T. is struggling with the same problem. Is this kind of unnatural conception right? Isn’t it wrong for a woman to bear another woman’s genetic child, much less pay for the egg? And finally, aren’t Emily and her husband too old to even consider having children?

Of course, one of the most often used objections—that the solution would degrade family values—must be left out in this case, which leaves the arguments rather weak. Emily and her husband are, presumably, of upstanding moral character. They’ve worked until traditional retirement years, even a bit later. And more importantly, they’re part of a long-lasting monogamous heterosexual relationship—the only kind that nobody has a problem with. The couple seems to have thought hard about the topic, and genuinely feel like retirement would be a good time to raise a child. There will be more free time to spend nurturing the child, and the child will have near-constant interaction with both mother and father.

Emily’s postmenopausal body is incapable of producing any more eggs, so she is no longer able to reproduce using her own genetic material. The rest of her reproductive system, however, is still fully functional. If the problem is that simple—she simply cannot produce an egg—then it doesn’t seem inconsistent with present-day medical theory to provide her with an egg. If we are willing to provide hormone injections for someone who lacks the physical ability to produce a certain hormone, why not provide eggs for a woman who lacks the physical ability to produce eggs? The same seems to be true for the second objection: that a woman cannot bear another woman’s genetic child. Why not? We have no problem allowing another person to donate an organ, despite genetic differences, so why not an egg? Obviously there is a difference here, in that an organ is, by itself, inanimate while a donated egg is meant for human life. But I find no reason within that difference to change our practice. The problem, I think, lies in our society’s overly biological definition of motherhood or fatherhood; we treat parent-child relations that are not genetic as inferior even in our language when we speak of the ‘real parents’ versus the ‘adopted parents.’ On the contrary, I think we reveal the true definition of parenthood when we ask the distracted dad or alcoholic mother, “What kind of parent are you?” The true sense of parenthood comes in the love and compassion manifested in the relationship; the biological relation exists to stimulate this love, not supplant it. While purchasing the egg presents somewhat more of a moral quandry, we need not assume that is what is happening here. Emily’s younger friend, who has agreed to serve as godmother, will donate the egg. Even if they were purchasing the egg, the well-intending and thoughtful couple would in no way be guilty of commodifying egg donation. They desire the egg for the best of reasons.

The final objection, the age of the would-be parents, is the most viable—and Dr. T. seems to have recognized that. Here we have a serious problem. The average life expectancy in the United States is about 75 years, which gives Emily 15 years and her husband only a little more than 10. Neither of these numbers is a desirable age for a child to lose a parent. Of course, 75 years is an average, not a mandate. If the couple is in good health, and after consulting several doctors (this is key), judge that they will, in all likelihood, live long enough to see the child into adulthood, our objections begin to disintegrate. But even then, it’s risky business. As the child grows and life speeds up, Emily and her husband will want to quiet down. Will they be able to keep up with the child in their old age? Here the couple must deliberate carefully about their own desires and expectations of retirement and old age, and to what extent they are willing to sacrifice those desires for a child. Are they willing to risk the emotional trauma of the child if one or both parents die while the child is still young? If yes, what provisions could be made? These are not decisions that can wait until after conception—as risk rises, so does responsibility.

Beyond this worry, which is, in the end, the business of Emily and her husband, Dr. T. should have no problem helping the couple with their request. The fundamental Christian aspiration is shalom, right relationships and ‘okayness’ about the state of affairs, and it seems obvious how fulfilling a child can be for both the parents and the child, whether naturally conceived, adopted, or whatever else. Family is the core unit of community, and community is the reason for creation. Why not help foster a new one, when we see the commitment and good intentions of those who seek to begin it?

1 May 2004 |
tags: Theological Ethics