Brian Hamilton

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A reading project on the philosophy of tech

I’m thinking through a new reading project on the philosophy of technology. I want to focus on what the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy calls the “humanities” philosophy of technology as opposed to the “analytic” philosophy of technology, i.e., the stuff written by non-technologists. I’ve read some of this before, or feel like I’ve absorbed it by osmosis, but never in a sustained way, and not since becoming a technologist myself.

It’s the distance between the humanist and technical perspectives I’m curious about. The SEP article says that the humanists “treat [technology] as a ‘black box’, a unitary, monolithic phenomenon” and are pretty uniformly critical after around the 1870s. I’m not sure I buy that they treat it as a black box any more than engineers themselves do, though they clearly think it’s possible and worthwhile to give a general account. The question is really just: how grounded is their general account? how caricatured? For myself: especially now that I’ve developed some taste for the intellectual habits of an engineer, what parts of my experience do they capture or fail to capture?

Here’s my working canon, though it will take many, many months to get through these at the pace I’m able to sustain these days:

  • Plato, Phaedrus
  • Francis Bacon, New Atlantis
  • Karl Marx, “Machinery and Large-Scale Industry,” (in Capital)
  • Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization
  • Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society
  • Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”
  • Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life
  • Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man
  • Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility
  • Neil Postman, Technopoly
  • Essays from Walter Benjamin, Langdon Winner, Donna Haraway, and Wendell Berry

I confess I’ve been relying more and more on AI for digging into a new thing I’m curious about. There’s something very engaging and genuinely productive in being able to frame questions in my own way, ask my own follow-ups, chase my own rabbits.

But as I read this morning through the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on philosophy of technology, I’m thinking about the trade-offs. The authors have put so much care into distilling and organizing the conversation. They’ve made thoughtful decisions about where to be critical and where to be neutral. I don’t agree with them on everything, but the fact that I’m forced to stick with their point of view for 50 pages means there’s a far greater chance that I’ll be persuaded about something new or that I’ll come away with a sharper sense of my own ideas. AI doesn’t have a point of view to stick with.

Gulliver's Travels, parts 1 and 2

Gulliver’s Travels is one of those books I probably never would have read without an outside push. I remember being made to read “A Modest Proposal” in high school English, which I found sort of abstractly funny but not very absorbing. Maybe I liked it enough to at least consider reading Gulliver, because I remember having a copy on my shelf, but I must have given up on it at some point; I can’t find that copy now. Maybe I was dissuaded by the terrible, saccharine cover on the edition I had, which featured a giant pair of hands holding glowing figurines.

Now I’m reading it for the Catherine Project’s core seminar. I just finished the first two parts—Gulliver’s encounters with the tiny people of Lillput and the enormous people of Brobdingnag—and it’s enormously fun and funny and charming. My six-year-old loves it too; she keeps asking me for another scene. I’m leaving out the nasty bits.

But the nasty bits are the funniest to me, if only because I didn’t at all expect them. (The terrible cover tricked me!) The first thing Gulliver does in both new lands he discovers is to take a shit. In Lilliput, the poor servants are consigned to carrying his feces away in wheelbarrows. In Brobdingnag (or Brobdingrag, as he insists in the preface it should have been spelled, which is also hilarious), he has to pantomime until his hosts understand what he needs and consent to carry him outside to the garden. In Lilliput the little people look up his pants and laugh in horror at the size of his testicles; in Brobdingnag he recalls with disgust having been made to stand (possibly naked?) atop the nipple of a lady of the court.

It’s all terribly weird, but I don’t think it’s just for shock value. The whole point of the book is to cast parts of our lives that seem so perfectly normal as to be forgettable into fresh relief. Both the vulgar and sublime come in for the same treatment.

I’ve heard that the book is supposed to be a brutal satire of English politics and religion and the rest, so much so that it could have gotten Swift in serious trouble, but it doesn’t really feel that biting to me yet. And I’m glad for that. There are clear moments of critique and ridicule, like when he describes how Lilliputians bury their dead upside down because they believe that God will turn the world upside down at the resurrection and they want to be ready, or when he talks about how stupid the Brobdingnagians are for not wanting to learn how to blow people up. But the book is capable of just being amusing and curious and weird; Swift doesn’t seem to be me straining to make everything into some negative allegory.

I’ll be interested this next week to get into the latter half of the book, because these first two parts are the only parts I’ve ever heard of, and really all the popular images seem to come from Part 1. The second half is a total mystery to me.

Albert Borgmann says in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life that a distinguishing feature of a “device” is the “concomitance of radical variability of means and relative stability of ends.” What matters about a device is what it does, not how it does it. “The concealment and unfamiliarity of the means” is the point: a device relieves us of the burden of caring about how it works.

This sounds like the kind of thing a critic of technology would exaggerate, on the way to portraying, as Borgmann does, the thing a device produces as a commodity that “can be enjoyed as a mere end, unencumbered by means.”

But I’m realizing how much this understanding of the device is an explicit goal in computer engineering. The distinction between the abstraction and implementation is fundamental. Noam Nisan and Shimon Schocken call it a “cognitive gift” (The Elements of Computing Systems, 2nd ed.) and “the most important design principle in hardware and software construction projects.” The “abstraction-implementation paradigm helps developers manage complexity and maintain sanity.”

In practical terms:

Whenever your implementation uses a lower-level hardware or software module, you are to treat this module as an off-the-shelf, black box abstraction: all you need is the documentation of the module’s interface, describing what it can do, and off you go. You are to pay no attention whatsoever to how the module performs what its interface advertises.

We’ve got a new member on our team who’s been doing a better-than-usual job of spinning up quickly. He took it upon himself to inventory the last ~6 months of recurring alerts and start figuring out which were genuine problems that needed attention and which alerts just needed to go away. What a smart first task: it’s an almost universal pain point, so if you can make a dent you’ll improve your team’s quality of life immediately, and understanding where the service you’re working on is hitting its limits seems like a really high-leverage way to start learning the service itself.

God forbid I have to spin up on a whole new system anytime soon, but if I do, I’m going to try this tack.

I’m only just discovering that I can use VS Code directly in my browser against an existing Github repo. This is great. Hopefully this will make it a bit easier for me to post to this blog from my work computer.

Or I could just give up and sign up for Micro.blog.

Parmenides on opinion

Parmenides has a strange relationship with “the opinions of mortals.”

On the one hand, they are clearly false. “Mortals have made up their minds to name two forms, one of which they should not name, and that is where they go astray from the truth.” By “two forms” he seems mainly to mean light and dark, but it’s really the idea of duality itself he has a problem with. Dark, presumaby, should not be granted the status of being “its own thing,” when it’s really just the not-being of light. It’s nonsense anyway to talk about what does not exist, since there’s nothing to talk about. The problem with “the opinions of mortals” is that we’ve built our entire perception of the world around these dualities, sometimes even turning them into elaborate and sophisticated sciences in their own right.

And yet for some reason I don’t understand it’s important to learn these opinions. Not just important—the goddess says it is necessary. The narrator must learn the opinions of mortals alongside the truth, even though there’s no reason to trust them (οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής).

The clearest reason we’re given is ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ, which I’m initially tempted to read as meaning, basically, “so nobody can make you look stupid.” Maybe learning the opinions of mortals is a kind of survival tactic, a practical necessity given that most people are not privy to the kind of divine knowledge the narrator has.

But I’m not quite convinced by that cynical interpretation. The goddess also adds this cryptic tidbit:

ἀλλ᾽ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

My Greek isn’t good enough for this, but it sure sounds to me like some stronger claim is being made here on behalf of the way things appear to be (τὰ δοκοῦντα). It sounds like the goddess might even be saying that the appearances are actually in some strange way true, though that contradicts everything else Parmenides says. My ignorant attempt to translate it would go something like:

But nevertheless, you’ll learn these things [the opinions of mortals] too: how it was necessary that the appearances really exist, pervading everything.

The two translations I have to look at right now are not much help. Richard McKirahan has:

But nevertheless you will learn these too–how it were right that the things that seem be reliably, being indeed, the whole of things.

What does that even mean? “How it were right that the things that seem be reliably”?

The public domain John Burnet translation has:

Yet none the less shalt thou learn these things also,–how passing right through all things one should judge the things that seem to be.

I think what Burnet is trying to get at here is that the goddess wants to give the narrator a way of understanding how mortal opinion went wrong. That fits much more easily with everything else Parmenides says, but it looks to me like a pretty willful rendering of the Greek.

And then there’s the fact that, in the opening scene, the narrator is being flown through the night sky by the daughters of the sun, to where Justice protects the gate between dark and light. It may be that this is all just the narrator’s own immersion in mortal opinion that he is learning to overcome, but that seems too easy. The duality of truth and opinion seems to be inscribed into the cosmos itself.

Maybe there are well-worn explanations for my confusions here; I haven’t read any of the literature. But to me, for now, this instability makes Parmenides much more interesting.

Ὁ Κατάσκοπος is different than most of the “easy Greek” out there. It’s not a graded reader; it doesn’t really start easy and get harder as you go. Instead, it keeps the vocabulary easy the whole time and lets the syntax be as hard as it needs to be the whole time. I wish we had more books like this. Most graded readers wait so long to introduce anything remotely complicated—even the future, much less the optative!—that it’s impossible to get any volume with it.

Two new essays on ignorance and moral reasoning

I was surprised this week to receive page proofs for not just one but two essays I had all but forgotten about. I wrote them both about two years ago, which is a long time even by the sad standards of academic publishing. But I’m very happy to see them finally coming to print, because they still feel vital.

Both essays make the same basic argument: that a certain practice of ignorance is central to moral reasoning. The heroes are Socrates, who claimed only the “peculiarly human wisdom” of knowing he knew nothing, and Augustine, who claimed that what knowledge he had was only a gift received after despairing of trying to obtain it. Both essays are working through what it means to teach moral reasoning.

The slightly earlier of the two, “AI and the Pedagogy of Ignorance,” was written for a Society for Ethics Across the Curriculum conference in October 2023. The immediate practical question in view there was whether this new-fangled thing called ChatGPT had a place in our ethics classrooms (in short: no!). Generative AI has changed in some fascinating and relevant ways since 2023, but I think the main argument holds up. It will be in the next issue of Teaching Ethics.

The other, “What are We Teaching When We Teach Moral Reasoning?,” was written for the Society of Christian Ethics conference in January 2024. That one responds to Jonathan’s Haidt’s dismissal (in The Righteous Mind) of “the rationalist delusion” by arguing that ancient “rationalists” like Socrates and Augustine have a much more subtle understanding of reason than Haidt does.

If you read either one and have thoughts, I’d love to hear from you!